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Racial discrimination uses race as grounds to discriminate in the treatment owed to others; 
sexual discrimination uses people’s sexual features as grounds for determining how they 
should be treated compared to others.  Analogously, statistical discrimination treats 
statistical inferences about the groups to which individuals belong as grounds for 
discriminating amongst them in thought, word and deed.  Examples of statistical 
discrimination include the employer who won’t hire women of childbearing age, because 
they are likely to take maternity leave at some point in their careers; or insurers who wish to 
charge more to young drivers than to more experienced ones, because they are more likely 
to have accidents than the latter – or to favour women over men in the cost of premiums 
for similar reasons.  Finally, a famous – infamous – example of statistical discrimination is 
racial profiling for police purposes, where statistical evidence of differential propensities to 
crime are used to justify preventive police measures, such as ‘stop and search’, which 
mainly target young black men, and other racialized minorities.  
The philosophical appeal of the concept of statistical discrimination is fairly easy to see: it 
draws our attention to the way that probabilistic claims figure, or might figure, in the 
distribution of social costs and benefits such as jobs, security, insurance.  It therefore gives 
us a way to test our moral intuitions across different cases, enables us to see how far our 
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moral judgements can be generalised, and whether they have been affected by particularly 
emotive examples, or by the particular features of a real or hypothetical case.   
Thus, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued there is nothing obviously wrong with using 
statistical evidence to determine our judgements when finer-grained evidence is unavailable 
or too difficult to obtain. In so far as there is something morally wrong with particular cases 
of statistical discrimination, he argues, the moral wrong is not in the use of statistics but 
some other feature(s) of the differential treatment, or of the reasons for it.  
For example, from a feminist perspective, the problem with the employer who discriminates 
against fertile women is not that s/he is using statistical generalisations in order to decide 
who to hire, nor that s/he is failing adequately to acknowledge that some women of 
childbearing age cannot have, or do not want to have, children.  The objection, rather, is to 
a situation where women can be legally penalised because of their fertility, although women 
generally get pregnant as a result of sex with men. Likewise, we might think it unfair to use a 
form of policing, such as racial profiling, whose burdens are significant and fall 
overwhelmingly on disadvantaged social groups, when the majority of people, no matter 
their age, sex, race or religion, do not engage in criminal activity and when there are other 
ways -random searches, universal searches, social policies-to deter and prevent crime.  
 The insurance cases seem to confirm the general point that statistical discrimination in 
itself is not particularly problematic.  Private insurance is not possible if companies cannot 
protect themselves against bad risks by charging higher premiums, or by refusing to insure 
particularly difficult cases altogether.  Hence, there seems nothing inherently objectionable 
in requiring inexperienced drivers to pay more than drivers with a record of years of safe 
driving behind them, so long as the disparities in premiums do not make it all but impossible 
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for most youngsters to drive, and therefore to acquire the experience that might reduce 
their premiums in future. If we are troubled by the idea of men paying more than women, 
then, this may reflect the sense that a pure private-insurance approach to car insurance fails 
adequately to reflect the socially important dimensions of driving in our societies. For 
example, if men do more driving than women, and more driving in difficult circumstances, it 
seems unfair to penalise them financially as compared to women by making them pay 
higher insurance premiums.  
But is statistical discrimination as innocuous as it seems, and what, really, can we conclude 
about it from cases like these?  After all, if statistical generalisations now figure in the 
justification of inequalities where ‘common sense’, religion, personal choice or employer 
preference might once have been sufficient, should we not ask what gives statistical 
generalisations this justificatory power, and how well-founded that power is 
epistemologically, morally and politically?   
Statistics, if accurate and useful, have to be constructed with care and difficulty from myriad 
sources which may not yet be suitable for statistical comparison and manipulation. Many of 
us lack the ability to understand (or accurately to report) quite basic statistical claims, let 
alone to assess more complex questions about the adequacy of different techniques for 
generating and interpreting them.  In short, there is a political economy and sociology of 
evidence that we need to consider when deciding whether the use of statistical evidence 
justifies treating otherwise similar people differently. An explicitly critical and social-
constructionist perspective on racial profiling, the hiring and promotion of employees or the 
treatment of risk is often a necessary philosophical supplement to more analytic studies. 
Analogously, we may have to supplement analytic approaches to statistical justification with 
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more critical perspectives, in order to evaluate the role of statistical generalisations in 
contemporary practices of justification.  
Suggestions for Further Reading:  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?  A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature of 
Discrimination (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 
R. J. Sampson and J. D. Raudenbush, ‘Social Anatomy of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Violence’, American Journal of Public Health, 95.2. (2005).  
 
